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Abstract:  Discouraged and marginally attached workers have received increased attention 
from policy makers over the past several years.  Theoretically, periods of recessions and high 
unemployment should directly influence individual’s decisions whether or not to search for 
employment, creating more discouraged workers.  Since 2003, there have been a number of 
large macroeconomic shocks (e.g. housing bubble, credit crunch, mass layoffs, etc.) which 
should affect job search intensity.  To date, the relative magnitude of these shocks on the 
search intensity of the unemployed (but currently undiscouraged workers) has not been 
established in the literature.   Using daily time use dairies from the American Time Use Survey 
2003-2009 allow us to proxy search intensity directly by aggregating time spent in minutes on 
several job search activities: time spent sending out resumes, contacting employers, 
interviewing, reading ads on the internet and so forth.  Results from Tobit estimation indicate 
the existence of significant negative wealth effects on search intensity through changes in the 
stock market and housing values that help explain the apparent acyclicality of search intensity 
observed in the data.   
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for their constructive comments from their seminar.  All errors are our own.   As of February 2011, over 1 million potential workers in the United States were identified as 
“discouraged,” a more than 250 percent increase from three years earlier (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2011).
1   Given the rapidly deteriorating labor market conditions brought on by the start 
of the Great Recession, this fact is not terribly surprising.   Though these potential workers would 
accept a full-time job if offered, they have given up searching because the cost of their job search 
outweighs the expected payoff.  Logically, during deep and prolonged recessions, the expected 
payoff from finding a job match declines, leading to substantial increases in the number of 
discouraged workers.  Moreover, this kind of pro-cyclicality of search intensity associated with 
the discouraged worker effect is likely to have propagating effects on the business cycle.  As 
search intensity decreases, the probability of a successful job match also decreases, resulting in 
longer duration of low levels of employment (Krause and Lubik 2011).  Given the potential costs 
of this drop in search intensity both to individuals as well as the economy as a whole, it is 
surprising labor economists know so little about the determinants of search intensity of the 
unemployed.
2 
In general, there is a dearth of empirical evidence regarding the extent to which search 
intensity varies over the business cycle.  The limited evidence that does exist suggests that search 
intensity may be acyclical.  Shimer (2004) finds that, after controlling for former industry, 
occupation, and duration, search intensity among active searchers did not appear to change 
significantly during the 2001 recession.
3  The finding that search intensity appears to be acyclical 
is somewhat puzzling in light of the evidence that many other features of the labor market (e.g., 
total hours worked, unemployment rate, vacancy rate, job destruction rate, job opening rate) are 
strongly correlated with the business cycle.  It is also at odds with the common acceptance of the 
discouraged worker effect.  1 
 
One possible reason for our inability to reconcile the apparent acyclicality of search 
intensity with the existence of discouraged workers may be a function of how search intensity is 
measured.  This problem is potentially solved by exploiting the American Time Use Survey’s 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010a) multi-year dataset.  To date, Krueger and Mueller (2010) is the 
only known study to use the American Time Use survey (ATUS) to look at the search intensity of 
unemployed workers.  In their paper, Krueger and Mueller estimate the impact of unemployment 
insurance (UI) benefits on search intensity.  As predicted by Mortensen (1977), their findings 
imply that as UI benefits increase search intensity declines.  However, due to their relatively brief 
sample period (2003 - 2007) and the scope of their paper, their findings say nothing about the 
behavior of search intensity over the business cycle.  
Understanding the behavior of search intensity over the business cycle is also important 
because of its implications for modern search theory.  In recent years, much of this literature has 
focused on the inability of existing models (e.g., Mortensen and Pissarides 1994) to account for 
the variation in the vacancy to unemployment (VU) ratio over the business cycle (Hall 2005, 
Shimer 2005, Hagedorn 2008, Pissarides 2009).  Understanding the behavior of the VU ratio is 
necessary to understanding the duration of business cycles.  Ultimately, time-varying search 
intensity presents a challenge to search models that seek to understand the excess volatility of 
the VU ratio relative to average labor productivity (Shimer 2005).   
The purpose of this paper is to help fill this void in the literature.  Using the data from the 
ATUS 2003-2009, we estimate the effects of idio- and non-idiosyncratic macroeconomic shocks 
on the search intensity of unemployed workers.  Our econometric specification is couched in 
terms of a random search model where intensity is determined by the three standard 
components of the canonical search model:  the cost of search, the likelihood an offer is obtained 
from a given amount of search, and the expected payoff conditional on an offer (Mortensen, 2 
 
1986).   Due to the natural variation in the data over this sample period and the differences in the 
level of aggregation of several key series, we are able to identify a number of correlated, but 
distinct shocks that have competing effects on the search intensity of individuals.  These include 
announcements of mass layoffs by state, changes in stock prices, and changes in regional housing 
values.  Overall, the paper makes a number of important contributions to the empirical literature 
on the determination of search intensity.  Most importantly, our results offer an explanation for 
the apparent acyclicality of search intensity.  In addition, because the data reveal significant 
variation in search intensity over time, the results have important implications for the modern 
search theorists in their ongoing effort to accurately account for the excess variation in the VU 
ratio.    
 
II.   Econometric Model 
  Based on the standard search model, a generalized model of search intensity (S) for the 
ith individual at time t can be written as 
(1)                                        
This represents the agents’ decision a la Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).  β represents the 
disutility, or costs, of search and depends on two sets of factors: the direct costs of search, c, and 
an the opportunity costs, l. Together,     is the likelihood of obtaining an offer given a unit of 
search time, where   is the arrival rate of offers conditional on search and   is a measure of labor 
market tightness.    is the responsiveness of search intensity to changes in the expected wage, 
E[w]. 
Theoretically, the disutility from search encompasses both an individual’s direct costs of 
search and the opportunity cost of all non-paid work.  We interpret the former as the disutility of 
effort associated with a unit of time spent searching for employment.  For direct search costs to 
play a significant role in determining search intensity, they must vary either by individual workers 3 
 
or across the business cycle.  At the individual level, it is reasonable to imagine that these costs 
vary across workers.  However, such differences will largely depend on factors such as worker 
education, industry, and experience.  Since these factors all affect the expected wage, it is not 
possible to model these idiosyncratic differences as pure direct search costs.   
Non-idiosyncratic shocks to direct search costs will ultimately be driven by changes in 
search technology.  While job search technology has undoubtedly changed in the last decade, 
these are arguably long-term change unlikely to vary across the business cycle.  Since there is 
little reason to believe that direct search costs vary across the business cycle, it is also unlikely to 
be correlated with variation in search intensity due to macroeconomic conditions, which is the 
focus of our study.  As a result, the lack of suitable proxies for direct search costs in the 
econometric model should cause no problems with our fundamental inferences.     
The opportunity costs associated with search plays a more instrumental role.  Not only 
does this vary substantially across workers, but there is good reason to believe that it varies over 
the business cycle as well.  First, we address those idiosyncratic factors that affect opportunity 
costs.  One way of thinking about this is in terms of each worker’s value of household production.  
For example, the presence of children in the household will increase the value of household 
production and increase the disutility of searching.  Thus, the presence of children, especially for 
women, is expected to decrease search intensity.  Similarly, because they can more easily (i.e., 
with less opportunity costs) substitute their time between paid work to housework, unemployed 
workers who are married may search less intensively than their unmarried counterparts.  In 
addition, the reason for one’s unemployment (e.g., on temporary layoff, voluntary job leaver, re- 
or new entrants into the labor market, or job loser) will serve as a proxy for unobserved personal 
preferences.  For example, if someone has voluntarily left a job it could be the result of family 
preferences, health issues, etc.  These would reveal a preference for leisure over work. Finally, 4 
 
age could proxy disutility from search as younger workers may value leisure relatively more than 
middle aged workers.  For example, younger workers are more likely to view additional education 
as an option during times of high unemployment than older workers.  At the other end of the 
spectrum, workers close to retirement may find searching for a job just a few years before 
planned retirement to be relatively more costly. 
In addition to opportunity costs varying across workers, they also vary across time.  The 
primary means of this variability is through the wealth effect.  Wealth directly affects the 
marginal utility of leisure.  Recall, the wealth effect is the effect due to changes in wealth while 
holding the real wage constant.  By focusing on the unemployed, we have a natural experiment 
from which to test the wealth effect.  If wages are sticky then the expected wage tends not to 
vary much over the business cycle.
4  While one’s expected wage will likely remain stable, wealth 
levels vary greatly over the business cycle.  The Great Depression has also been referred to as the 
“Great Compression” due to the massive loss of wealth (Goldin and Margo 1992).  The recent 
business cycle shows striking similarities in many ways, with the S&P 500 losing over 50 percent 
of its value from November 1, 2008 to April 13, 2009.  Of course, the decline in wealth has not 
been limited to stocks but has included other assets as well, including housing.  From 2001-2007, 
there was wide-spread appreciation in housing prices.  Large decreases in the price of housing 
starting in late 2007 caused record defaults and record low housing starts.  The variation of 
wealth across individuals and time will related to these two factors provides substantial variation 
in the value of leisure across workers.   
In addition to stock and housing assets, the availability of unemployment insurance (UI) 
benefits represents another important source of wealth for the unemployed. Mortenson (1977) 
develops a model that endogenizes the decision to search as well as the amount of time spent 
searching.  In his model, unemployment benefits directly affect search intensity.  In general, he 5 
 
finds the effect of an increase of UI benefits on search intensity to be ambiguous depending on 
state unemployment benefit structure.   However, recent evidence by Krueger and Mueller 
(2010) suggests that unemployed workers who are eligible for UI benefits actually respond to an 
increase in UI benefits by searching less.   
  The second component of the job search model is the probability of an offer conditional 
on search.  As the probability of receiving an offer conditional on search decreases, search 
intensity should fall.  Labor market tightness is the key to determining the arrival rate of job 
offers, conditional on search.
5   Macroeconomic shocks to the labor market perturb the 
equilibrium employment level.  As a result, tightness in the labor market varies widely across the 
business cycle (Blanchard and Diamond 1989).   A common measurement of labor market 
tightness, the VU ratio, is shown in Figure 1.  During recessions there are increasing separations 
and fewer vacancies created.  Of course, such conditions are likely to vary significantly by 
location.   Naturally, these shocks have large effects on the arrival rate of jobs, and thus search 
intensity.    



























































































































































Job Openings 6 
 
 
The third and final component of the standard search model given in equation 1 is the 
expected wage offer conditional on search.  As expected wages increase, the intensity of search 
will as well.   Hall and Milgrom (2008) find strong evidence of wage rigidity driven by a wage 
bargaining process restricted to “credible” threats.  Their work implies job creation and job 
destruction are much more sensitive to changes in productivity than wages.  If wages are rigid, 
then expected wages should remain relatively stable over the business cycle.  The higher the 
predicted wage, the more incentive there is for each unemployed worker to search intensively.   
 
III. Data  
To estimate the model given in equation 1, data are pooled from several sources.  Data 
representing macroeconomic shocks come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010c) and 
Standard and Poor’s (2011a) and (2011b).  All data on individual workers come from the 
American Time Use Survey (ATUS) 2003-09 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010a); this is a multi-year 
dataset is a pooled cross-section of its annual surveys.   
The ATUS is a sub-sample of the Current Population Survey (CPS) (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2010b).  Individuals selected for the CPS are interviewed monthly for 8 months.  
Following that, a sub-sample is selected for the ATUS. The ATUS interviews are conducted 2-5 
months following the final CPS monthly survey.  Each respondent is randomly assigned one day 
(diary day) in which to record their activities.  Respondents record activities starting at starting at 
4 a.m. the interview day and end at 4 a.m. on the following day.  In addition to the nature of the 
activity, respondents are asked where the activity took place, who was present during the 
activity, and, duration of the activity.   7 
 
We restrict the sample to unemployed workers between the ages of 20 and 65 who are 
not enrolled full-time in school.    This restriction allows us to abstract from complications due to 
retiree benefits as well as parental benefits provided to teenagers and college students. While 
our sample of unemployed workers is defined in the same way as Krueger and Mueller (2010), 
we also include data from the first two years of the Great Recession.  This sample provides a 
great deal of variation in employment status and macroeconomic shocks that are likely to affect 
the search intensity of workers. 
 
III.A. Search Intensity 
The data used to construct search intensity come from the ATUS.  Because the ATUS 
provides detailed data on time use, we are able to measure the time each worker spends 
searching during their diary day.  In the 2003-09 multi-year dataset from the ATUS, activities 
related to job search include job search activities (t050481), job interviewing (t050403), waiting 
associated with job interviews (t050404), security procedures associated with search or 
interviews (t050405), and other job search activities not otherwise specified (t050499).      
Estimated search intensity for unemployed workers over the sample period is given in 
Figure 2.  We report two measures of intensity: average search time and average search time for 
those participating in search activities during their diary day (i.e., mean search | search > 0).  The 
most interesting fact in this graph is the dramatic rise in search intensity at the beginning of the 
recession in 2008, followed by an equally dramatic decline. In addition, there is no obvious 
relationship between search intensity and the unemployment rate.  This is consistent with 
Shimer’s (2004) argument that search intensity appears acyclical.   However, the percent of 
unemployed engaged on any given day in job search activities appears to be counter-cyclical (see 
Figure 3) as the percent searching rises with the unemployment rate.  This is particularly 8 
 
interesting because it is consistent neither to Shimer’s argument nor our common understanding 
of the discouraged worker effect. 
Figure 2: Search Intensity (average minutes per day, weighted)
6
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III.B.  Idiosyncratic factors that affect the opportunity costs of search  
Unemployed workers are classified into four groups: job losers, workers on temporary 
layoff (expecting to be recalled by employer), job leavers, and re- and new entrants.  These 
classifications are constructed from information in the CPS and ATUS.  Since the ATUS interview 
occurs 2-5 months following the CPS interview, it is not possible to rely solely on the 
classifications in the CPS.  The CPS variable (pruntype) that contains this information asks all 
unemployed workers the reason for their unemployment.  Job leavers are those who have 
voluntarily left their jobs (pruntype=4). The remaining categories, job losers, those on temporary 
layoff, and re- and new entrants require additional information from the ATUS interview.  Re- and 
new entrants include those who have not recently been in the labor force but are currently 
seeking employment (pruntype=5,6) in the CPS.  It also includes workers who were not in the 
labor force in their CPS interview (pemlr=5,6,7) but consider themselves unemployed in the ATUS 
interview (telfs=4).  To determine if an unemployed worker is on temporary layoff, we use 
information from the ATUS on whether  they have been given any indication that they will be 
recalled to work within the next 6 months (tulay6m) and whether they have been given a date 
for their return (tulaydt).  Job losers include those who do not expect to be recalled or whose 
temporary job ended (pruntype=2,3).  We also have a number of workers who have lost their 
jobs between the time they did the last CPS interview and the time they do the ATUS interview.  
These workers are those who were working in the CPS (pemlr=1,2) but who are unemployed in 
the ATUS (telfs=3,4).   
  As outlined previously, individuals vary in their opportunity costs of search time.  Because 
we have no way to proxy personality differences, we are forced to rely on basic demographic 
characteristics that are likely to be related to these preferences and proxy the individual’s returns 
to household production.  To account for these, we use basic information from the ATUS 10 
 
regarding factors such as sex, marital status, age, and the presence of children in the household.  
Because we expect large differences across sex, we use a number of interactions between sex 
and marital status and the presence of children.  For age, we include age and age
2 because we 
expect the youngest and the oldest unemployed workers to search less intensively than middle-
aged workers.   
 
III.C. Non-idiosyncratic factors that affect the opportunity cost of search (wealth effects) 
In addition to idiosyncratic differences across workers, the opportunity cost of search is 
also affected by macroeconomic conditions and policies that generate wealth effects.  The 
macroeconomic shocks relevant here are stock and housing market fluctuations.  The relevant 
policies that generate wealth effects have to do with the level and availability of unemployment 
insurance benefits across states.   
Changes in stock and housing prices over the sample period are shown in Figures 4 and 5.  
Econometrically, it is important to be able to identify separate wealth effects for each of these 
factors.  This is accomplished in two ways.  First, the stock market represents aggregate changes 
in stock wealth at the national level.  On the contrary, we are able to construct regional housing 
values using the Case-Shiller housing market data.  As we see in Figure 5, there are tremendous 
differences both in level and variation across the four census regions.  In addition, housing prices 
started falling in most regions in late 2006.  The stock market did not crash until a year later.   
Furthermore, the stock market rebounded sharply in 2009 while housing values increased only 
modestly.  As a result of these differences, we feel confident that the model is able to uniquely 
identify separate wealth effects due to changes in stock and housing values. 
 
   11 
 
Figure 4: S&P 500 from 2003 to 2009 
 




























































































Wealth effects are also generated from the availability of UI benefits.  In general, these 
vary by state of residence and by individuals, since UI benefits depends on one’s previous 
earnings.  Unfortunately, because we do not know from the ATUS data what the individual’s 
earnings were previous to becoming unemployed, there is no way to estimate individual UI 
benefits.   As a result, we follow Krueger and Mueller (2010) and use the maximum weekly 
benefits allowed by each worker’s state of residence to proxy unemployment benefits for those 
eligible (Department of Labor 2010).  
  To proxy the wealth effects related to the availability of UI benefits, it is necessary to be 
able to determine which workers are eligible.  Consistent with the literature, we define UI eligible 
individuals as those who have lost their job as well as those on layoffs. However, not all states 
provide benefits to part-time workers. Thus, we only include part-time workers in the sub-sample 
of those eligible for benefits if their home state provides such benefits (Department of labor 
2010).  For the period 2003-07, workers unemployed for more than 26 weeks are considered not 
eligible.  Of course, after 2008 the federal government passed two extension laws, the 
Emergency Unemployment Compensation act of 2008 (UEC08) and the Extended Benefits (EB) 
act of 2009.  The 2008 legislation, passed in multiple supplemental bills, provided for four tiers of 
extended benefits.  Tier 1 provided for 20 additional weeks, Tier 2 additional 14 weeks, Tier 3 13 
additional weeks and Tier 4 6 additional weeks, for a total of 53 additional weeks.  The EB act of 
2009 provided for up to 20 additional weeks on top of that.  To complicate matters, extended 
benefits in each state (and each tier) have different effective dates.  Using the information 
provided by the Department of Labor (2010), we are able to determine how many weeks of 
unemployment benefits for which each unemployed worker is eligible.  This information is used 
to measure with some degree of certainty whether an individual is eligible for benefits at any 
given time.      13 
 
III.D. Labor Market Tightness 
Ideally, job vacancies would be the best measure to proxy the effects of local labor 
market conditions.  Unfortunately, job vacancies are not available at the state or local levels.  
However, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010c) collects unemployment claims resulting from 
mass layoffs is available by state and month.  This measure has another benefit as it is not 
constructed from the unemployment rate.  The problem, of course, with the unemployment rate 
is that it is endogenous to the search habits of unemployed workers.  Thus, we use mass layoffs 
to serve as our proxy for tightness in the labor market.  As mass layoffs increase, the probability 
of receiving a job offer decline.  As a result, search intensity should decrease.   
 
III.E. Expected Wage 
Finally, for each unemployed worker we estimate a predicted real wage to proxy their 
expected offer conditional on search.  This is simply a predicted wage for each worker conditional 
on their human capital and geographic location.  To estimate the predicted wage, we run 
separate regressions for all men and women who are employed full time using data from the CPS 
outgoing interview file for the period 2003-2009.  This resulted in 99,495 men and 96,456 women 
between the ages of 20 and 65 who reported earnings and were not full-time students.  
Regressors included age, age squared, dummies for the level of education, and dummies for the 
state of residence to control for variation in the cost of living across states.  In addition, we also 
ran separate regressions for each sample year to generate the predicted wage for each worker.  
This allows for potential changes in the marginal returns to experience and education that may 




IV. Tobit Results 
Because minutes spent searching as constructed from the ATUS data is censored at zero, 
the model cannot be estimated consistently via OLS.  Instead, Tobit estimation must be used.  
The results of our estimation of equation 1, using the empirical proxies discussed in the previous 
section, are summarized in Table 1.  Note that the Tobit coefficients reported in Table 1 
represent             where y
* is the latent variable.  It is common, however, to interpret the 
marginal effects in terms of their effect on the observed variable, Y.  This also facilitates 
comparisons to coefficients obtained from OLS regressions.  Thus, the marginal effect         
             where      is the standard normal cdf.       represents the adjustment factor 
that must be multiplied by each coefficient in order to interpret the marginal effects.  We 
evaluate the adjustment factor at the means for all xj.  This adjustment factor is reported in Table 
1. 
Overall, the results support the general model.  In particular, search intensity is 
negatively related to the likelihood of obtaining a job offer as proxied by announcements of mass 
layoffs.  For every 10,000 workers laid off in a state, daily search decreases by about 6.2 percent 
(                     =-10.469*0.150=-1.547/25.991=6.1%), or about 11 minutes per week.  
This suggests there is a significant “discouraging” effect of large layoffs during times of deep 
recessions.   At first blush the size of this effect appears small. However, layoffs of 10,000 
workers in a given state and month is only slightly above the average for this period (8,594).  In 
early 2009, for example, some states experienced monthly layoffs in the neighborhood of well in 
excess of 20,000 workers.  Moreover, the induced decrease in search intensity does not account 
for cumulative effects.      
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Table 1: Tobit Regression Results  
Dependent Variable:  Search Time  Mean=25.991  Adjustment Factor=0.150 
Independent Variables  Mean  Coeff.  Std. error 
Mass layoffs/10000  8,594  -10.469***  3.481 
ln(S&P 500)  6.327  -85.843**  35.556 
ln(Case-Shiller index)*homeowner  2.459  -7.647**  3.497 
ln(Predicted wage)  11.010  133.757***  29.641 
ln(Max weekly benefits)*UI eligible  2.800  3.272  4.112 
On temporary layoff  0.152  -204.692***  29.233 
Job leaver  0.027  27.656  45.846 
Re- new entrant  0.363  -62.510**  25.018 
Female  0.420  -14.459  23.491 
Married  0.445  -76.844***  19.813 
Female*Married  0.187  98.360***  28.558 
Female*Children  0.185  23.265  35.714 
Children  0.576  -23.994  24.646 
Age  39.974  1.435  4.279 
Age2/100  17.374  -2.486  5.224 
 
 
   
Sigma    222.370***  10.390 
Pseudo R
2    0.045 
Obs    3129 
Notes: 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Both models also include controls for day of the week, month and whether it was a holiday. 
Standard errors are constructed using the ATUS weights and are clustered by state of residence. 
 
 
There is strong evidence that stock and housing prices alter search intensity.  A decrease 
in stock prices (S&P 500) of 5 percent would increase search time by over 4 minutes a week.  This 
translates into an elasticity of -0.50.  While this appears small, recall that the stock market fell by 
about 50 percent in the first half of 2009.  There is also evidence that unemployed home owners 
increase their search time if local housing prices fall.  However, this effect is quite small with an 
estimated elasticity about one-tenth that of stock prices (-0.044).  There are a couple of reasons 
why workers would respond relatively more to changes in stock versus housing prices. One, 
changes in stock prices are more evident to workers.  Unlike the stock market, housing markets 
are far more localized, and current market information is difficult to ascertain.  Two, even if 16 
 
housing price information was as readily available to the public as stock market prices, 
homeowners likely would not respond quickly to changes in housing prices because real estate 
wealth is relatively illiquid.  If unemployed workers intend to smooth consumption during 
unemployment periods by drawing down their wealth, then it makes sense that they would be 
relatively responsive to changes in stocks prices, but not housing prices. 
There is also evidence that search intensity varies with changes in the expected returns 
to work.  First, search is strongly related to one’s expected wage offer.  The elasticity with respect 
to increases in expected wage is 0.77.   This is largely related to education, sex and experience.  
Surprisingly, search intensity is not significantly affected by the availability of unemployment 
benefits.   Of course, theoretically, higher benefits should reduce search intensity.   
Interestingly, the evidence that those with a higher opportunity costs of searching 
(higher marginal utility from leisure or household production) have lower levels of search 
intensity is somewhat mixed.  Being married and the presence of children has essentially no 
effect on women’s search time.  Married men, however, search significantly less than unmarried 
men.  The fact that married men are less likely to search than married women appears surprising 
at first.  However, this result is consistent with recent findings by Gough and Killewald (2010). 
They find that unemployed men were more likely to shift their time to household production 
than unemployed women.  This explanation is also consistent with recent work by Burda and 
Hamermesh (2009) on the effects of cyclical unemployment on housework.   They found that in 
areas with high cyclical unemployment, the unemployed shifted more towards household 
production than to leisure.  
While household characteristics have only mixed effects on search intensity, the reason 
one is unemployed strongly affects search.  The omitted category consists of job losers who do 
not expected to be recalled to their previous job.  Those who do expected to be recalled search 17 
 
significantly less than these workers, about 30 minutes less per day.  Given the mean search for 
the sample, these unemployed workers are essentially not searching, all else equal.  Re- and new 
entrants into the labor market also search significantly less than job losers or job leavers.  This 
group searches about one hour less a week on average.  This result is not unexpected as these 
workers have already proven to be relatively less attached to the labor force than those who 
previously had a job.  Finally, there is no evidence age plays a role in search intensity decisions.  
While age and age-squared had the expected signs, they are statistically insignificant.  
Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising that there is little evidence those close to retirement are 
not decreasing their search intensity relatively more than younger counterparts.  However, this 
does not account for decisions to merely retire early, and thus leave the ranks of the 
unemployed.  Similarly, younger workers might be deciding to become full-time students in 
response to being unemployed during the recession. 
 
IV. Sensitivity Analysis and Discussion 
IV.A. Are Stock and Housing Prices Indicators of Wealth Effects or Supply Shocks? 
The negative effects of stock and housing values on search intensity theoretically could 
represent either wealth effects or indicators of broader macroeconomic stability.  As wealth 
effects, they would show that an individual’s level of wealth acts to decrease search intensity in 
much the same way as unemployment insurance benefits.  However, if a drop in the stock market 
is more of a signal of general macroeconomic conditions (or maybe expectations), then search 
intensity would decrease due to the expectation of a decreased likelihood of finding a job.   
In order to sort out the true interpretation of these two factors, housing and stock prices, 
we estimate how the marginal effects on search intensity vary across the distribution of workers’ 
wealth.  Theoretically, wealth effects should have larger marginal impact on those with more 18 
 
wealth.  That is, a fall in stock market prices should have little or no effect on those with less 
wealth.  On the contrary, those workers with large assets should be much more responsive to 
such effects.  If changes in the stock market indicate general macroeconomic conditions, workers 
with lower expected wages should respond more negatively to such news because the demand 
for their skills is more likely to decrease, leading to fewer vacancies than those with higher skills.  
In other words, those with higher predicted wages (more wealth) should respond less to 
changing labor market conditions, but more to a precipitous loss in their personal or household 
wealth.   
As a simple test for this, we generate the marginal effects of changes in housing prices 
and stock prices at different levels of predicted wages.  These results are summarized in Table 2.  
As we see, increases in both stock and housing wealth affect workers with higher predicted 
wages relatively more than those at the lower end of the distributions.  The results are consistent 
across the percentiles and both explanatory variables.  Together, these results are strongly 
supportive of the “wealth effect” interpretation.  That is, as stock and housing prices fall, wealth 
falls, increasing the time devoted to job search.  Thus, it appears that these variables are not 
merely proxying changes in labor market conditions that affect the probability of receiving a job 
offer.  Those effects are captured uniquely by the announcements of mass layoffs (see Table 1).  
 
Table 2: Marginal effects by expected wage on the search time  
  Percentiles based on the individual’s predicted wage  
dy/dx with respect to:  10  25  50  75  90 
ln(S&P 500)  -11.787**  -15.217**  -19.062**  -23.241**  -28.839** 
ln(Case-Shiller Index)  -1.050**  -1.355**  -1.698**  -2.070**  -2.391** 
Notes: 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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IV.B. Implications for the Cyclicality of Search Intensity 
One of the most interesting puzzles in the recent search literature is the acyclicality of 
search intensity observed by Shimer (2004) (see Figure 2).   The results above help to uncover at 
least one possible explanation for this.  Taken together, the combination of increasing layoffs 
that decrease search intensity, and falling wealth which increases search, counteract each other.  
The large increases in housing and stock wealth leading up to 2008 led to a decrease in search 
intensity, even given the relatively steady job market.  After the start of the financial crisis in 
2008, there were unprecedented drops in wealth.  The housing market and stock markets 
stabilized in 2009, while the job market worsened.  The dramatic increase in layoffs, then, 
resulted in a decrease in search intensity, even while the percent of the unemployed actively 
searching increased.
7   
 
V. Conclusion 
  In this paper we have investigated the search intensity of searching unemployed.  Using 
data from recent time-use surveys, we are the first to document the variation in search intensity 
in response to a number of recent, large-scale macroeconomic events including stock and 
housing market collapses, and mass layoffs.  In the process, the paper makes a number of 
contributions to the literature on job search intensity of the unemployed.   
First, our research establishes how search intensity responds to non-idiosyncratic 
macroeconomic shocks.  We find strong evidence that the searching unemployed decrease their 
search intensity significantly in response to mass layoffs in their state of residence.  We also find 
evidence of wealth effects.  In particular, the unemployed respond rather strongly to changes in 
stock market values, and weakly to changes in local housing market conditions. As stock values 
decline, unemployed workers respond by increasing the intensity of their job search, all else 20 
 
equal.  These wealth effects intensify in individuals with a higher expected wage, further 
supporting the interpretation that these represent true wealth effects rather than indicators of 
general labor market conditions. 
  Second, more broadly these results offer insight into the acyclicality of search intensity 
cited previously by Shimer (2004).  The story of wealth and substitution effects that comes from 
our results is much richer than that of the standard aggregate model typically used in the 
literature, and may have important implications for policy makers.  Searching unemployed 
appear to respond as expected to decreases in the demand for labor.  As mass layoffs increase, 
searchers decrease their intensity due to the diminished expected probability of obtaining a job 
offer.  This effect in isolation would indicate the pro-cyclicality of job search.  However, wealth 
also varies across the business cycle and search responds to changes in wealth.  When stock 
values fall, search intensity increases.  This accounts for the large increase in search intensity 
observed in 2008 at the beginning of the Great Recession.  Thus, the net effect during these 
months was indicative of a counter-cyclical effect of search intensity.  However, as stock values 
stabilize as the recession progresses, the wealth effect becomes less prominent.   On the 
contrary, layoffs continue to increase, leading to subsequent drops in search intensity.   
  Finally, this paper can be seen as offering evidence to inform future general equilibrium 
models of search intensity.  Most obviously, search intensity is neither exogenous nor invariant as 
is assumed in standard labor search models.  The fact that search intensity responds to changes 
in asset prices across the business cycle has implications for the modeling of search intensity in 
real business cycles models.  Incorporating worker heterogeneity should be particularly 
interesting when considering search intensity in response to changes in policy, such as changes in 
fiscal policy or tax reform.      
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VII. Notes 
                                                        
1 Calculated using Table A-1 and A-15 from Monthly Employment Situation Report. 
 
2 There have been a number of papers that model the effects of search intensity over the 
business cycle on certain labor market outcomes such as the matching function (see Merz 1995, 
Andolfatto 1996, Gautier 2007, and Shimer 2008).   
  
3 In his paper, he uses data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1994-2004.  However, 
there are limitations to using the CPS in this regard.  The CPS records worker responses regarding 
the types of search they used.  Search intensity is defined somewhat narrowly as the number of 
search tasks undertaken in efforts to secure employment, such as searching for employment in 
the newspaper, or interviewing for a job.  Moreover, the CPS does not measure the actual time 
spent on these search activities.   
 
4 Krueger and Muller (2010) implicitly make this same assumption to estimate effects of UI 
benefits on search intensity.   
 
5 Job search technology also affects the probability of obtaining an offer conditional on search.  
The internet has reduced the cost to post and apply for a particular vacancy.  The total amount of 
help-wanted ad space has decreased during the last 10 years as the unemployed and firms 
substitute away from the relatively more expensive newspaper ads to electronic ones.   The 
economic recovery from the 2001 recession has virtually no increase in the column square inches 
of ad space.  This is likely due to the increase in internet penetration rates from 1992 recession to 
the 2001 recession.  Internet penetration rates increased from 1.7 percent of Americans with 
Internet access to 59.8 percent (World Bank 2011).  Both of these features support an increasing 
efficiency of job search over time but not cyclicality over the business cycle.  Before 2001, 
newspapers ads were negatively correlated with business cycles.    
 
6 All descriptive statistics are weighted using the weights provided by the ATUS 2003-09 
(tufnwgtp).  
 
7 We ran the model under multiple specifications, including one in which the sample only 
included months in which a state had no mass layoffs reported. The results still indicated strong 
wealth effects with respect to the S&P 500 and housing values, consistent with our results in 
Table 1.  However, the sample size for this subset was dramatically smaller, and thus not 
reported.   